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ABSTRACT
Inmany settings wheremultiple agents interact, the optimal choices
for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These
coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differ-
ential game, in which players have differing objectives, the state
evolves in continuous time, and optimal play may be characterized
by one of many equilibrium concepts, e.g. , a Nash equilibrium.
Often, problems admit multiple equilibria. From the perspective
of a single agent in such a game, this multiplicity of solutions can
introduce uncertainty about how other agents will behave. This
paper proposes a general framework for resolving ambiguity be-
tween equilibria by reasoning about the equilibrium other agents
are aiming for. We demonstrate this framework in simulations of
a multi-player human-robot navigation problem that yields two
main conclusions: First, by inferring which equilibrium humans are
operating at, the robot is able to predict trajectories more accurately,
and second, by discovering and aligning itself to this equilibrium
the robot is able to reduce the cost for all players.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence has the potential to improve human life in
many ways, for example making ground and air travel safer, au-
tomating repetitive and mundane tasks, and making knowledge
and information easier to access. One of the biggest technical chal-
lenges that has been encountered in early attempts at autonomy is
consistent, safe, and efficient interaction with humans. A common
way of approaching this problem is to assume a behavior model
for humans and then choose actions for the autonomous agent
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Figure 1: Illustration of the strategy alignment problem in a
3-player navigation scenario that admitsmultiple local equi-
libria.
that minimize a cost function given this model. The human model
may be specified by hand as an open-loop prediction or a feed-
back policy [14, 31] or by fitting behavior to data [13, 25, 29, 38].
However, simple models may not match the real world, and it is
difficult to gather enough data or guarantee that learned models
will generalize correctly to cases outside the training distribution.
An alternative to specifying a behavior model is to specify or
learn a cost function and assume that other agents behave in a way
that minimizes the cost they accrue. In this setting, the optimal ac-
tions of a given agent depend heavily on the actions taken by other
agents. A mathematical formalism that captures this interaction is
a general sum dynamic game. Optimal play in such games may be
characterized by one of many equilibrium concepts, e.g. , a Nash
equilibrium, a condition in which no player will unilaterally choose
to switch strategies. Since finding a global Nash equilibrium is
generally computationally intractable [6], several techniques have
been developed to find local approximations of Nash equilibria for
specific problem classes [21, 35], and recent advances have made
it possible even for multi-player differential games in continuous
time with continuous state and control spaces [10, 11, 34, 35].
However, one important drawback is that many problems of in-
terest have multiple local equilibria. Moreover, even if a dominating
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equilibrium that minimizes the cost for all players exists, expecting
other agents to find this optimal solution may be overly optimistic.
If agents behave according to strategies corresponding to differ-
ent equilibria, the resulting cost may be very high for all players.
Therefore, while recent work provides efficient algorithms to find
approximate Nash equilibria for a wide range of problems [10, 35], it
is not immediately clear how an autonomous agent should choose
among multiple equilibria in practice. We use the term strategy
alignment problem to refer to the challenges associated with the
presence of multiple equilibria.
One potential solution to this issue would be to establish a strict
hierarchy between agents, allowing leading players to announce
their plans and expect others to follow, thus relaxing the interactive
game to a sequential planning problem [5]. However, this approach
necessitates some form of direct communication between agents
which is, in itself, a challenging problem as inhomogeneous groups
of agents (e.g. humans and robots) may struggle to explain their
plans to each other [18].
In this work, we propose a general framework that addresses
the strategy alignment problem without direct communication or
negotiation between agents. Instead of requiring globally optimal
decisions of all players, we assume that other agents approximately
choose their strategies according to a local equilibrium of the game.
To handle the resulting uncertainty arising from the multiplicity
of local equilibria, we use a particle filtering technique, abstractly
illustrated in Fig. 1, to infer the equilibrium that other players are
aiming for. By utilizing this information, we enable the autonomous
agent to make more accurate predictions and align itself to this
equilibrium to compute a more efficient strategy.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
To put this work in context, we provide a brief overview of related
work that is concerned with modelling and planning in multi-player
settings. Here, we survey both game-theoretic approaches as well
as other techniques that can be broadly categorized as partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) approximations.
Game Theoretic Approaches. Various works have approached
the problem of multi-agent interaction from a game-theoretic per-
spective. As the mutual dependence of each players actions on the
decisions of others poses a computational challenge, a common ap-
proach is to simplify the problem by establishing a leader-follower
hierarchy between players to arrive at a Stackelberg dynamic game
[30]. Such approaches have been demonstrated in the context of
human-robot interaction [27, 28, 37] but have been shown to yield
undesirably aggressive behavior of the leader [8].
Other approaches avoid this pure leader-follower structure and
aim for more symmetric roles of different players. In [8], the in-
teraction is modelled in a hierarchical approach that solves a fully
coupled dynamic game to inform a low-level controller. However,
this approach solves the high-level Nash game through discretiza-
tion of the state and input space and thus does not easily scale to
multiple players.
To avoid the curse of dimensionality while maintaining symmet-
ric roles of different players, recent work has focused on applying
algorithms akin to differential dynamic programming to find ap-
proximate local Nash equilibria in dynamic games [10, 11]. While
these works make contributions in efficiently computing locally
optimal solutions to general-sum differential games, they do not
address the key practical challenge of choosing among multiple
local equilibria. In this paper, we directly build on the results of
[10, 11]. Based on this local game-solver, we propose a general
framework for reasoning about which equilibrium other players
are operating at and align the ego agent’s strategy accordingly to
handle cases in which a unique solution does not exist.
POMDP Approximations. Several works address behavioral un-
certainty by modeling certain aspects of human behavior as latent
state variables and maintaining belief over these variables to com-
pute optimized decisions. In the field of autonomous driving, infer-
ence of behavioral parameters has been demonstrated to provide a
significant benefit when interacting with other drivers [31] and a
significant amount of work has focused on using this information in
approximate POMDP schemes [4, 14, 31, 36]. However, these works
typically use highly simplified models like IDM [33] and MOBIL
[16] for the behaviors of other players. Similarly, in [7, 12, 23] a
library of hand-engineered feedback strategies is used to model the
behavior of other agents. While these work demonstrate the benefit
of employing behavioral inference, the policies used to model the
behavior of other agent’s are somewhat arbitrarily chosen and may
not specify suitable behavior for all cases.
Other works model humans as rational agents seeking to max-
imize their own objective function. In [1, 9], humans actions are
predicted as the outcome of a noisily-rational decision process [2]
with unknown goals. Here, inference is used to reason about both
the intentions of humans as well as the accuracy of the predictive
model. However, these works treat agents as independently opti-
mizing players and capture interaction between multiple agents
only indirectly by reducing the confidence of predictions.
In this work, we model interaction explicitly by casting this
problem as dynamic game and use inference to discern between
different modalities that can result even with known objectives. We
stress, however, that the framework we present is more general and
may in future work be used to capture other sources of uncertainty
including uncertainty in the objectives of humans.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND APPROACH
We consider a single autonomous agent A operating in a shared
space with N − 1 humans Hi , and use the convention that the
autonomous agent always has index 1. The joint state, x , of all
agents evolves over time, t , according to an ordinary differential
equation
Ûx = f (t ,x ,u1, . . . ,un ), (1)
where each agent i is in control of an input ui to the system of joint
dynamics. Additionally, each agent has a cost
Ji (u1, . . . ,uN ) =
∫ T
0
дi (t ,x ,u1, . . . ,uN )dt , (2)
defined as an integral of running costs дi over a finite horizon T
and implicitly depends upon the initial state x(0). The objective of
each player is to minimize their respective cost function under the
constraints of the dynamics by choosing a suitable state feedback
strategy γi , i.e.
ui (t) = γi (t ,x(t)). (3)
The cost function captures the behavior of each agent by encoding
different aspects of their preferences. Together, the state dynamics
and the objectives of each player pose an optimization problem that
may be cast as a finite-horizon N -player general-sum differential
game.
RunningExample. For the sake of clarity, we introduce a running
example which we will use throughout this paper to illustrate the
problem formulation as well as our approach. In this example we
consider three agents — a robot and two human players — that
navigate in a shared environment with no obstacles (c.f. Fig. 1).
Defining the joint state to be x = [x1;x2;x3], each agent’s dynamics
are those of a 4D unicycle
Ûxi =
[ Ûpx,i ; Ûpy,i ; Ûθi ; Ûvi ] = [vi cosθi ;vi sinθi ;ωi ;ai ] , (4)
where each agent is in control of the longitudinal acceleration ai as
well as the steering rateωi of their respective systems. The behavior
of each agent is characterized by the following objectives:
(1) Reach a preset goal state xд,i within the horizon T .
(2) Minimize control effort.
(3) Prefer low velocities.
(4) Avoid collisions with other players.
For each player a piecewise quadratic cost is formulated to encode
these preferences. For the control inputs ui , velocity state vi and
terminal state error | |xi (T ) − xд,i | | quadratic penalties are used.
The collision-avoiding interactions are modeled collaboratively
with semi-quadratic penalties on the pairwise distances between
players. As some of the aspects of this behavior (crucially collision
avoidance) depend implicitly or explicitly on the joint state of at
least two agents, this problem requires each player to reason about
the decisions of other players.
3.1 Local Equilibrium Problem
While in general, there exist different notions of optimal play in a dy-
namic game, here we assume that all agents approximately optimize
for a local Nash equilibrium. Considering an overloaded notation
where Ji depends upon strategy profiles (γ1, . . . ,γN ) rather than
control inputs (u1, . . . ,uN ), a local Nash equilibrium is attained
if each player follows a strategy γ ∗i such that the strategy profile
satisfies
J∗1 = J1(γ ∗1 ;γ ∗2 ; . . . ;γ ∗N ) ≤ J1(γ1;γ ∗2 ; . . . ;γ ∗N ),
J∗2 = J2(γ ∗1 ;γ ∗2 ; . . . ;γ ∗N ) ≤ J2(γ ∗1 ;γ2; . . . ;γ ∗N ),
...
J∗N = JN (γ ∗1 ;γ ∗2 ; . . . ;γ ∗N ) ≤ JN (γ ∗1 ;γ ∗2 ; . . . ;γN ),
for γi in the local neighborhood of γ ∗i . An in-depth characterization
of local Nash equilibria can be found in [26]. Intuitively, this condi-
tion entails that no player has a unilateral incentive to make a small
deviation from his/her current strategy. This choice of equilibrium
models symmetry of information between different players in this
game.
Restricting the search to local Nash equilibria is a common re-
laxation [21, 34, 35] to reduce the computational complexity of the
otherwise intractable optimization problem [6]. However, evenwith
this relaxation finding local Nash equilibria remains computation-
ally challenging [21] and many results are restricted to two-player
zero-sum settings [21, 22] or search over open-loop trajectories
instead of feedback strategies [34, 35]. Rather, we use a recent, com-
putationally efficient method which finds approximate local Nash
equilibria by solving a sequence of linear-quadratic (LQ) games
[10]. This further relaxation yields equilibria that qualitatively re-
semble local Nash, though in fact they are global Nash equilibria
of successive LQ approximations to the original game. Moreover,
each individual LQ game affords an analytic solution via coupled
Riccati equations, making the overall algorithm extremely efficient.
We use the term approximate local Nash equilibrium to refer to this
equilibrium concept. The qualitative nature of these equilibria is
discussed in Section 5.2.
While there is no general theoretical guarantee that any ap-
proximate local Nash equilibria exist in a given game, in practice,
they are commonly present. For example, in all of the experiments
conducted in this work, these equilibria were found. In fact, many
problems of interest have multiple local equilibria. However, it is
important to understand that even if one or more local equilibria
exist, there is no guarantee that any of these are globally dominant
(i.e. have simultaneously lower cost for all players than any other
strategy profile). Furthermore, even if a globally dominant equilib-
rium exists, this equilibrium may not be unique; there may be other
equilibria that achieve the same cost.
Running Example. For our running example it is intuitively clear
that it allows for multiple local equilibria due to the structure of
the cost. That is, for each pairwise encounter of two players the
involved agents need to decide on which side they pass each other.
While for some cases this conflict may be trivially resolved because
both players have a strong preference for the same solution, other
scenarios require some form of negotiation to resolve the ambiguity.
In the next section, we will elaborate on howwe resolve this conflict.
3.2 Strategy Alignment Problem
To resolve this conflict between multiple equilibria, we slightly
break the symmetry between the players in the following manner.
First, we assume that humansHi automatically agree with other
human players on a local solution of the game. This agreement
between humans can be thought of as the innate ability of humans
to communicate through subtle cues that are difficult for robots
to pick up on. Therefore, we do not expect humans to be able to
communicate with robots with similar clarity. Instead, it is the
robot’s responsibility to infer the equilibrium negotiated by the
humans and align to their preferred local solution. By this means,
we preserve local symmetry but allow humans to take a leading
role in globally selecting an equilibrium.
In accordance with these assumptions, the local equilibrium at
which human players operate is modeled as a latent state that the
agent cannot directly observe. Instead, the agent A receives obser-
vations of only the physical state, x . The term strategy alignment
is used to refer to the process of inferring this latent state and
adapting to the corresponding equilibrium strategy.
Running Example. Figure 1 illustrates the strategy alignment
problem for our running example. Here, by solving the strategy
alignment problem the robot allows humans to chose their preferred
local solution while maintaining shared responsibility for collision
avoidance. Another perspective on this problem is the fact that this
type of strategy alignment allows the robot to account for modeling
errors in the cost used to encode the human behavior. For example,
when approaching a human that comes straight at the robot, from a
robot’s perspective it seems reasonable to model humans as having
symmetric preference for passing on either side. However, humans
may have cultural or otherwise unmodeled preferences for a specific
solution.
4 INFERENCE-BASED STRATEGY
ALIGNMENT
We present a general framework for solving the strategy align-
ment problem presented in Section 3. On a low level, our approach
utilizes iterative LQ approximations of the game as proposed in
[10] to approximate local Nash equilibria of the game. By seeding
this local solver with numerous samples from an explicitly defined
distribution over initial strategies, we induce an implicitly defined
distribution of local equilibria. At every time step, we then use
approximate Bayesian inference — in an approach similar to par-
ticle filtering — to recursively update the belief over the latent
equilibrium with observation of the physical state x . Using this
a-posteriori belief we extract the most likely equilibrium and align
the robot’s strategy accordingly.
4.1 Finding Local Equilibria
Our method is, for the most part, agnostic to the solver used to
compute local equilibria of the game. There are two requirements
for a solver to be used in the new framework. First, it must admit
some form of persistent state that encodes a specific equilibrium
to be used for inference as measurements are received. Second,
because inference must be run at near real-time planning rates,
the solver needs to be sufficiently fast to allow solving the game
for multiple equilibria at every planning step. In this work we use
the iterative linear-quadratic method proposed in [10]. While for
a detailed presentation of this approach we direct the reader to
[10, 11], here we only provide a brief outline of the method to show
how it is embedded in our inference scheme.
On an abstract level, the approach extends the idea of the well
known ILQR algorithm [19, 32] to the domain of N -player general
sum differential games. Given the initial joint state x0 as well as
initial strategies γi,0 for every player, the algorithm iteratively
updates this strategy until convergence using the following steps:
(1) Simulate the joint state trajectory using the current strate-
gies.
(2) Locally approximate the game along this trajectory by lin-
earizing the dynamics and quadraticizing the cost.
(3) Update the strategies using the analytic solution to the LQ
approximation of the game via dynamic programming.
If this algorithm converges, the resulting strategies compose an
approximate local Nash equilibrium of the game. Additionally, as
the algorithm is deterministic, given the same initial strategies γi,0
it will arrive at the same equilibrium. Hence, the set of initial strate-
gies can be directly used as an implicit representation of the latent
equilibrium state, fulfilling the first solver requirement. Further-
more, initial strategies can be used to warm-start the solver. As our
inference method uses the LQ game solver in a receding horizon
approach, this property allows us to rapidly update solutions using
: latent equilibrium
: predicted physical state
: Player-1's (robot) input
: true physical state
: time index
Figure 2: Dynamic decision network used to model the equi-
librium inference problem.
the last set of converged strategies yielding the speed that fulfills
the second requirement.
4.2 Inferring the Local Equilibrium
Since the robot does not know the equilibrium that the humans
have chosen, it can only attempt to infer how likely each equilib-
rium is. As we assume that the robot is able to measure the state
perfectly, in a perfect mathematical abstraction, there would be a
unique trajectory for each equilibrium, and the robot could elim-
inate solution hypotheses if they did not match the observations
exactly. However, in reality, there are several sources of uncertainty.
First, real humans do not behave exactly according to equilibrium
strategies and instead follow trajectories that are difficult to model
perfectly. Second, there will always be discrepancies between the
dynamics and costs in the game used for planning and the actual dy-
namics and preferences of humans in the real world. Finally, there
is some numerical noise in the game solutions, so even if the model
dynamics and costs matched the real world perfectly, strategy pro-
files attained for a specific equilibrium with the method described
above may deviate within the tolerance of the convergence check.
Because of this uncertainty, we use Bayesian inference to reason
about the latent equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the dynamic decision
network used to model the corresponding inference problem. As
specified in Section 3.2, the robot’s decision at time step t + 1 is
informed by past observations of the physical state, x1:t , while
the equilibrium, kt , generating the human behavior remains un-
observed. At every time step, the next equilibrium, kt+1, depends
upon the previous equilibrium, kt , and physical state, xt , as the
human players update their strategies to account for the decision of
the robot. xˆt+1 represents the predicted physical state that would
be attained if all human players followed the equilibrium strategy
exactly. The true physical state, xt+1, is modeled as an emission
of xˆt+1 to account for deviations of human players from the exact
equilibrium strategies due to the sources of uncertainty discussed
above. With this model, the exact Bayesian update to maintain a
belief, b, over the latent equilibrium, k , may be computed as
bt+1(kt+1) ∝
∫
kt ∈K
∫
xˆt+1∈X
[p(xt+1 |xˆt+1)
p(kt+1, xˆt+1 |ut+1,kt ,xt )bt (kt )]dxˆt+1 dkt .
(5)
Unfortunately, evaluating this update rule is computationally chal-
lenging as enumerating all equilibria in the equilibrium space, K ,
is generally intractable [6]. However, by sampling initial strategy
profiles and solving the game at these points we can sample a subset
of K . Using this idea, we approximate the update, Eq. (5), through
a particle filtering technique.
First, K approximate local Nash equilibria are sampled by ran-
domly selecting seed strategies from a problem-specific distribution
and solving the game at each of these points. This seed distribution
is necessarily dependent on the specific state space and dynamics of
the problem, but it was not difficult to find suitable distributions for
the experiments conducted here. In general, the seed distribution
must cover the strategy space in a manner that allows to recover
the relevant equilibria that human players may consider; equilibria
that are not attained by any sampled seeding of the solver can
not be inferred. Therefore, the performance of our method when
applied to different environments and tasks depends on the abil-
ity to specify a suitable seed distribution. In this work, open-loop
strategies, γi,0(t ,x) = [βω cos(t/Tπ ); βa cos(t/Tπ )], correspond-
ing to s-shaped trajectories with uniformly sampled turn rate and
acceleration parameters, βω and βa , were used for all players.
Each of the resulting strategy profiles is referred to as a particle
and has a corresponding weight. All weights are initially 1, but as
new state measurements are received at each time step, the strate-
gies are adjusted and the weights are updated so that particles that
explain the observed trajectory well have higher weights. Specifi-
cally, when a new state measurement arrives, the game is re-solved
in a receding horizon fashion (e.g. warm-started using the previous
game solution) to determine the updated strategies, and a predic-
tion of the physical state, xˆ , is made with the resulting strategy
profile. From the perspective of a vanilla particle filter, this step
corresponds to sampling a transition for every particle from the
transition density, p(kt+1, xˆt+1 |ut+1,kt ,xt ) (c.f. Eq. (5)), where the
process of solving the game and integrating the dynamics consti-
tute the generative transition model. The weight for the particle is
then updated by evaluating the probability density p(x |xˆ (k)) which
captures potential deviations of humans from the exact strategy cor-
responding to equilibrium k . These steps correspond to Algorithm 1,
lines 5 through 9. Finally, after each particle has been updated, the
weights for particles that represent the same equilibrium, as de-
termined by measuring the distance between the trajectories, are
combined. This step is represented by the CombineDuplicates
function called in line 10 of Algorithm 1.
The deviation model, p(x |xˆ), is somewhat arbitrary because it is
meant to capture the three difficult-to-model sources of uncertainty
mentioned above. In this work, a Gaussian distribution is used, as
is commonly done in cases where uncertainty is difficult to model,
but is expected to be unimodal. Specifically for these experiments,
X ∼ N(xˆ , ϵO I ). It would also be possible to incorporate domain
knowledge into the algorithm by using a more complex distribution.
Given the widespread use and demonstrated effectiveness of
particle filtering, it is likely that this technique can be extended
to cover more complex scenarios including when humans switch
between equilibria with techniques that improve robustness, such
as resampling.
4.3 Globally Aligned Closed-Loop Planning
After the inference algorithm hasweighted each of the sampled solu-
tions, the robot must decide which feedback strategy to apply. There
are many possible candidates for the best strategy. If the weights
are appropriately normalized, then they define a probability distri-
bution over the sampled equilibria particles (i.e. P(k) = w (k )∑
k∈Γ w (k )
).
This structure is analogous to a belief in a POMDP formulation
[15, 17] where the human player’s choice of equilibrium is the la-
tent part of the state. Thus, solution concepts used for POMDPs are
applicable here.
It is well known that to find the optimal solution of a POMDP,
the agent must reason about the information they will receive in
the future. However, this is computationally intractable in general
[24], so approximations are usually used. Commonly used approxi-
mations include generalized QMDP [20, 31] and planning assuming
the most likely or mean latent state [31]. In the present setting,
QMDP is difficult to apply because it is difficult to evaluate every
possible control input against all of the strategies the other players
might take. Moreover, the mean latent state in this setting corre-
sponds to the weighted average of several equilibrium strategies,
which is usually not a strategy that a human would take. For these
reasons, we use only the maximum-likelihood a posteriori equilib-
rium to make control decisions, specifically applying the control
specified by the robot player’s strategy in that equilibrium as shown
in Algorithm 1, line 12.
Algorithm 1Maximum A Posteriori Aligned Control
1: Sample K particles
{
γ (k )
}
from initial strategy distribution
2: Γ ← {1..K}
3: for each time step t do
4: Receive observation x(t)
5: for each particle index k in Γ do
6: γ (k ) ← SolveGame
(
x(t − 1),γ (k )
)
7: xˆ (k ) ← x(t − 1) +
∫ t
t−1 f
(
τ ,x(τ ),u1(τ ),γ (k)−1 (x(τ ))
)
dτ
8: w(k) ← w(k )p(x(t)|xˆ (k ))
9: end for
10: Γ ← CombineDuplicates(Γ)
11: kMAP ← argmax
k ∈Γ
{
w(k )
}
12: u1(t) ← γ (kMAP)1 (x(t), t)
13: end for
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the benefits of inference-based strategy
alignment by comparing our approach to a baseline approach simi-
lar to previous methods [10, 11] that does not include inference. For
this purpose, we use the running example introduced in Section 3.
After stating some of the implementation details, we first demon-
strate the multi-modality of the problem by enumerating some of
the approximate local Nash equilibria for this problem. We then
evaluate the prediction performance of our approach by isolating
it from the control part in a purely observing setting. Finally, we
study the interaction dynamics and performance of the strategy
alignment approach in a closed-loop planning scenario.
5.1 Implementation Details
We implement the LQ game solver proposed in [10, 11] as well as
our strategy alignment framework using the Julia programming
language1 [3]. By this means, we provide a fast and flexible imple-
mentation that can be easily adapted to other scenarios and other
types of uncertainty. Our current implementation of the inference
framework is single-threaded. We stress, however, that large parts
of our method are trivially parallelizable as solutions for individual
particles can be computed independently.
Table 1 shows the parameters used throughout the experiments.
Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
time step ∆t 0.1 s
simulation horizon Ts 10 s
prediction horizon Tp 10 s
number of particles (3-player) K3 50
number of particles (5-player) K5 150
observation noise ϵO 0.1
5.2 Local Equilibria
We begin by analyzing the qualitatively different approximate local
Nash equilibria that exist in a multi-player navigation problem. For
each of the experiments presented in this section, we generate a
collection of equilibria by solving the multi-player game for ran-
domly sampled initial strategies (e.g. see Fig. 3, right). We then
apply k-means clustering on the state trajectories traced out for
each sample to discern the different types of encounter geometries.
5.2.1 Minimal Example: 2-Player Scenario. For the sake of clar-
ity, we first consider a 2-player version of our running example.
This simple example demonstrates that even in the minimally com-
plex case of an 2-player encounter a unique dominating strategy
profile may not be found and thus some form of strategy alignment
is required.
Figure 3 shows the two clusters of solutions that can be found
in this setting. Here, Player-1’s trajectory is shown in blue, while
Player-2’s trajectory is shown in red. The saturation of the respec-
tive colors indicates the average cost incurred by the player for
the particular equilibrium, where higher saturation corresponds to
lower cost. Additionally, the clusters are sorted from left to right in
ascending order of cost incurred by Player-1. To give an intuition
for time, for each trajectory we highlight each players initial po-
sition as well as their position when they are closest to the other
player with circular marks. This simple example shows that the
game allows for two qualitatively different equilibria. In the equilib-
rium corresponding to the first cluster Player-1 (blue) accelerates
while Player-2 (red) slowly approaches the conflict area to let the
other player pass first. Additionally, both players slightly deviate
from the straight path to their respective goal to make room for
the other player as they share responsibility for collision avoidance.
In the equilibrium corresponding to the second cluster the players
1Code available at github.com/lassepe/GameInference.jl
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Figure 3: Clustered local equilibria for a 2-player navigation
problem. Left: blue goes first. Center: red goes first. Right:
initial strategies.
take opposite roles. The examination of the cost for each cluster
reveals that the player passing the conflict area first incurs a slightly
lower cost than the player who is forced to decelerate and wait at
the intersection. Thus, it is clear that neither equilibrium dominates
the other. Instead, each cluster corresponds to different plausible
mode of interaction.
5.2.2 Running Example: 3-Player Scenario. We now add a third
player to the navigation problem to recover our original running
example as introduced in Section 3. The clustered local equilibria
for this scenario are depicted in Fig. 4. Here, the third player’s
trajectories are shown in purple. The clustering reveals a total
number of eight qualitatively different local equilibria. The two
solutions with the lowest cost for all players — shown in the first
two sub-figures of Fig. 4 — correspond to a clockwise or counter-
clockwise circular motion in which all players equally deviate from
their straight path to the goal while maintaining almost constant
speed. The remaining solutions can be understood as all possible
sequential orders in which players can pass the conflict zone. That
is, in each of these cases one player accelerates on the straight path
to its goal to pass the conflict zone first. Another player follows
with moderate speed and slightly deviates from its straight path to
the goal to avoid a collision. The last player approaches the conflict
zone at low speed and waits for the others to pass before continuing
on a straight path to its goal.
The examination of qualitatively different approximate local
Nash equilibria for the 3-player navigation scenario shows that
the problem immediately becomes more complex, merely through
the number of combinations in which the players may pass the
conflict zone. Therefore, it is clear that with increasing number of
players hand-specifying suitable behaviors for all possible cases is
undesirable and thus a more principled approach should be taken.
5.3 Prediction
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed infer-
ence method independently from closed-loop interaction dynamics.
For this purpose, we again consider our running example of a 3-
player navigation problem. However, in this experiment the agent
does not control any inputs to the system but rather observes the
interaction of three players as they follow a set of strategies cor-
responding to a local equilibrium. At every time step, the agent
receives an observation of the physical state x . With this infor-
mation, it is the agent’s task to accurately predict the trajectories
of all players over a receding horizon of Tp = 10 s. We compare
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Figure 4: Clustered local equilibria for a 3-player navigation problem. Markers highlight positions at initial time and half the
simulation horizon.
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Figure 5: Mean squared prediction error over receding pre-
diction horizon for the 3-player running example. Blue: Pre-
diction with equilibrium inference (ours). Gray: Prediction
with random local equilibrium (baseline).
our inference method proposed in Section 4.2 to a baseline that
does not actively reason about different solutions but instead uses
a randomly sampled local equilibrium to predict the trajectories of
all players. Note that while the baseline does not actively reason
about the equilibrium that the players operate at, it still benefits
from state-feedback as it re-solves the game in a receding horizon
fashion after every observation of the physical state.
Figure 5 shows the mean squared prediction error E
[| |p − pˆ | |2]
of the position p = [px,1;py,1;px,2;py,2;px,3;py,3] over the reced-
ing prediction horizon for our method and the baseline. Each curve
is generated from 100 simulations of the 3-player scenario. Ribbons
indicate the standard error of the mean. As the agent receives an
exact observation of the physical state at the current time and fur-
thermore knows the goal locations xд,i of all players, both methods
achieve a low prediction error at the beginning and the end of
the prediction horizon. However, in the intermediate range that
is crucial to predict how conflicts are resolved our approach is
able to significantly reduce the prediction error by inferring the
equilibrium the game is played in.
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Figure 6: Distribution of costs incurred by each player. Left:
Player-1 uses strategy alignment (ours). Right: Player-1 op-
erates at a random local equilibrium (baseline).
5.4 Planning With Strategy Alignment
Finally, we test the performance of the full inference and planning
framework in a closed-loop interaction scenario. In this experiment,
the behavior for all human players is generated by solving the game
for a randomly selected equilibrium. All players generate their
respective strategies over a receding horizon, therefore replanning
after every time step to close the loop. We compare our maximum
a-posteriori aligned planner to a baseline that solves for a fixed
equilibrium which we randomly sample at the beginning of each
simulation run.
5.4.1 Running Example: 3-Player Scenario. Figure 6 shows the
distribution of costs incurred by each player over 100 simulations
of the 3-player scenario for both planning approaches. It is clear
that the maximum a-posteriori aligned planner performs signifi-
cantly better than the non-adaptive baseline. By actively aligning
to the equilibrium chosen by the human players, the robot not only
reduces its own cost but also the cost the remaining players. In
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Figure 7: Distribution of costs incurred by each player in a 5-player navigation problem. Left: Player-1 uses strategy alignment
(ours). Center: Player-1 operates at a random local equilibrium (baseline). Right: Example of a local equilibrium.
other words, inferring the intentions of the humans allow the robot
to act more predictably and therefore permits a more favourable
outcome due to the general sum nature of the game.
Moreover, we are able to solve this 3-player version of the strat-
egy alignment problem at near real-time planning rates. While solv-
ing for a single approximate local Nash equilibrium from scratch
takes on average 50ms for this example, warm-starting allows to
update solutions with an average runtime of just under 2ms. Thus,
after having initialized all particles at the first time-step our planner
runs in real-time when used in a receding horizon fashion.
5.4.2 Scalability: 5-Player Scenario. Finally, we test scalability
of our method by applying it to a 5-player version of the navigation
problem. In order to handle the increased complexity of the game,
here we solve it by exploiting feedback linearization of the dynamics
as proposed in [11]. Note that for this purpose we reformulate the
objectives directly in the linear coordinates. Thus, the numerical
value of the cost does not directly compare the costs received in
the 3-player version of the game.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of costs incurred by each player
over 100 simulations of the 5-player scenario for our approach as
well as the baseline. Again, we observe a significant improvement
by inferring the local equilibrium and aligning the robot’s strategy
accordingly. In particular for the ego-agent this improvement is
even more significant than for the 3-player running example as
the increased complexity of the problem reduces the chance of
choosing a compatible strategy without actively reasoning about
the equilibrium targeted by other players.
It must be noted that the increased number of particles and the
higher computational complexity of finding equilibria significantly
increase the run-time for this problem. In our current implementa-
tion of the 5-player navigation problem, solving for a single local
equilibrium from scratch takes on average 285ms, and 131mswhen
utilizing warm-starting. Accordingly, a planning step takes 19.7 s
when updating all 150 particles using a single thread. However, as
many particles converge to the same equilibrium and particles are
eliminated as the estimator becomes more confident the average
runtime is only 3.2 s for our example. Further improvements can
be made by utilizing multiple threads for the belief update.
6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
We have presented a general framework for game theoretic plan-
ning for problems in which the multiplicity of equilibria causes
uncertainty about how agents are likely to behave. We formulate
the equilibrium that other players aim for as a hidden state that
the agent can infer by contrasting their decisions to sampled ap-
proximate local Nash strategies in a technique similar to particle
filtering. By extracting the most likely hidden equilibrium we arrive
at a planning scheme that allows the robot to align its predictions
and its strategy with observed behavior.
We demonstrate our framework in simulations of a multi-player
human-robot navigation problem which we formulate as a general-
sum differential game. Using this example, we show that by infer-
ring which equilibrium humans are operating at, the robot is able
to predict trajectories of humans more accurately, and observe that
by aligning itself to this equilibrium, the robot is able to reduce the
cost for all players. Due to the sample based belief representation
and hinging on recent progress towards efficiently solving general-
sum differential games to local equilibria [10, 11], we are able to
run our method in real time for a 3-player navigation problem and
demonstrate that even for 5 players the runtime is moderate.
In future work, we would like to test our framework in a human
user-study to understand if our model applies to real world sce-
narios. Beyond that, currently we plan with only the most likely
equilibrium from the maintained belief. As our method computes a
particle belief over equilibria and corresponding feedback strategies
for all players, a wide range of approximate planning techniques
for partially observed decision making problems may be used to
make better decisions in the face of high uncertainty. The first of
these techniques that we plan to explore is generalized QMDP. Fur-
thermore, our framework can be adapted to incorporate knowledge
about how other players may change their choice of the desired
equilibrium by modelling this decision as a probabilistic transition
of the latent state. In particular, this approach can be used to account
for the fact that humans may be likely to change their strategy if
otherwise they incur a high cost. Finally, we would like to employ
the prosed inference method to infer other latent variables such as
parameters of the objectives of other players.
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